The standard theory of compensating wage differentials assumes that workplace accident risk is exogenous to workers, predicting a positive relationship between risk and wages. This paper incorporates safety investments by workers into the canonical model, which produces an additional negative relationship between individual accident risk and wages. We then exploit NLSY panel data merged with 3-digit occupational workplace accident data from the BLS to investigate the role of unobservables when estimating compensating wage differentials. In addition to netting out time-invariant unobservable worker characteristics, we use weight gains of workers as an observable proxy for depreciation of risk-specific human capital. Our models yield a precisely estimated positive compensating wage differential. Consistent with our model, we also observe a significant negative association between individual risk and wages, but only in high risk occupations. Our resulting estimate of the value of a statistical injury (VSI) equals $23.5K, which ranges at the lower end of previous VSI estimates. The finding that the obesity wage penalty only exists in physically demanding high risk occupations-but that it does not vary by gender within those jobs-suggests that occupational sorting and productivity differences are a major driving force of the obesity wage penalty for females.
Introduction
The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWD) posits that workers must be compensated with higher wages for accepting unpleasant job conditions. Occupational safety is one such undesirable attribute. This leads to the standard prediction of a positive association between onthe-job accident risk and wages (Thaler and Rosen 1975). 1 Economists are interested in the relationship between job risk and wages because it informs us about the way the labor market works (cf. Viscusi and Aldi, 2003; Kniesner et al. 2012) .
Policymakers care about it because it is used as an estimate of workers' valuation of job conditions and their health.
Whereas existing papers do model worker sorting into jobs, the canonical hedonic wage model treats workplace safety as exogenous to the individual worker. Only firms have the ability to change the workplace environment. Firms can either pay workers higher wages for accepting the higher risk of accidents, or they can reduce the risk by investing in safety and pay lower wages. The majority of empirical studies base their analyses on this CWD theory and typically abstract away from the possibility that workers could invest in safety (or safety-related productivity). 2 In reality, there may be opportunities for workers to lower the risk of accidents. For example, in 2014, the most common job in 28 U.S. states was being a truck driver; it is telling that a quarter of fatal occupational injuries consist of highway accidents (Census of Fatalities Occupational Injuries 2004; NPR 2015) . Employees can obviously take action that their employers cannot undertake and make safety investments to avert accidents. Large consulting firms advise employers on how to motivate employees to improve their safety behavior. 3 Industry compensation policies also support 1 In this paper, we refer to "risk" and "safety" somewhat interchangeably, acknowledging that risk and safety are the converse of each other. 2 An earlier literature recognizes the importance of worker behavior in affecting the risk of accidents (Oi 1974; Chelius 1974 ). 3 http://safetymanagementgroup.com/; several studies suggest that bonuses are indeed associated with reductions in accident rates. Gregersen et al. (1996) finds that bonuses for safe driving significantly reduce the number and costs of accidents. Nafukho et al. (2004) examine the performance of tractor-trailer truck drivers in a U.S. trucking company and find that bonuses are associated with a reduction in accidents. Gossner and Picard (2005) derive cost-benefit rules for the notion that workers can alter their safety-related productivity-i.e. invest in safety-and get rewarded or penalized for it. Examples are safety bonuses and wellness programs (Baicker et al, 2010) . In a survey of 40 long haul trucking firms in Canada, 70% of them had a safety incentive program. 4 NATIONWIDE INSURANCE, CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS and GENERAL MOTORS have programs that reward seat belt use. DENARK CONSTRUCTION's employees receive a bonus check if they avoid OSHA citations, violations of company safety policies, and accidents. Cawley and Price (2013) report that US employers are increasingly adopting workplace wellness programs which would be associated with body weight loss among employees.
One of this paper's contributions is to estimate compensating wage differentials for nonfatal risk in a panel setting and to investigate the roles of (a) time-invariant unobservable worker characteristics, e.g., risk preferences, and (b) changes in safety-related human capital. To guide our empirical analysis, we extend the canonical hedonic wage model by allowing for worker investments in safety. In the classical Thaler and Rosen (1975) case, firms face a tradeoff between producing output or job safety. The safety they produce is "sold" to workers in the form of lower wages. Firms supply and workers demand safety. Our model extension allows for the demand but also the supply of safety by workers. This enhanced model yields important implications for the relationship between accident risk and wages. As the standard theory predicts, job risk and wages will be positively correlated, but only when the risk is "produced" by the firm (or technology). In contrast, when safety is "produced" by workers, our enhanced model predicts a negative association between the individual risk of accidents and wages. The theoretical insight that worker-and firm-produced safety affect wages in opposite directions carries over to the empirical estimation of CWDs.
automobile safety regulation when drivers may adapt their risk-taking behavior in response to changes in the quality of the road network. Furthermore, companies report client testimonials of how programs have reduced their accident rates and costs (Cable 2005 ). 4 http://data.tc.gc.ca/archive/eng/innovation/tdc-summary-13200-13256e-896.htm
The empirical part of this paper exploits a uniquely compiled dataset. It links panel data from the NLSY 1979 to 3-digit occupational risk data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as well as data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) . We obtain a remarkably precise positive CWD estimate for nonfatal on-the-job risk. For every additional injury per 100 full-time workers, wages increase by 0.5%. This implies a VSI of about $23.5K, which falls into the lower range of existing estimates, consistent with reduced VSL estimates when correcting for unobserved heterogeneity (Viscusi and Aldi 2003; Kniesner et al. 2012) .
Because changes in individual safety-related productivity are very difficult to operationalize, we take an indirect empirical approach: We employ (observable) changes in body weight as a proxy for what we call risk-specific human capital. Given that body weight is to a large degree modifiable, gaining weight and becoming obese can be seen as a form of human capital disinvestment in safetyrelated productivity, particularly in risky jobs. 5 We view this set of skills as "risk-specific," akin to firm-specific human capital. It loses its value in jobs that have no accident risk. In addition, obesity has been shown to significantly increase the risk of accidents (Stoohs et al. 1994; Froom et al. 1996; Craig et al. 1998; Engkvist et al. 2000; Xiang et al. 2005; Yoshino et al. 2006; Finkelstein et al. 2007; Ostbye 2007; Lakdawalla et al. 2007 ). The medical literature provides a plenitude of reasons why obese workers are more prone to accidents. Among the reasons are higher risk of drowsiness, a higher likelihood of falling, lack of concentration, and more physical limitations (Corbeil et al. 2001; Shutan 2003; Pollack et al. 2007 ). There also exists direct evidence that obese workers are less productive (Ricci and Chee 2005; Cavuoto and Nussbaum 2014) . Finally, using NLSY data and estimating a rich fixed effects model, we find that becoming obese is significantly associated with an increased risk of having an accident by 21%. 5 Note that our economic model and empirical tests do not hinge on whether one interprets gaining weight more broadly as a form of human capital depreciation, or more narrowly as a form of disinvestment in workplace safety.
In line with our enhanced model and in addition to the standard positive CWD estimate, we obtain a similarly strong negative association between a decrease in safety-related human capital and wages. However, this wage penalty for observable depreciation of risk-specific human capital (through weight gains) only appears in high-risk occupations, which reinforces our theoretical insights. While we do not claim our empirical results can be given a direct causal interpretation, the wage effects are identified by an extremely rich individual, occupational, and industry-specific fixed effects model. The model nets out unobserved time-invariant worker characteristics and focuses on changes in body weight for employees who do not switch jobs. The empirical part illustrates the importance of considering not only time-invariant unobserved worker heterogeneity, but also timevariant job-specific worker productivity. Our empirical CWD estimates change in size and significance once we control for unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity and changes in worker productivity.
In addition to its contributions to the hedonic wage and workplace accident literature (Seabury et al. 2004; Boone et al. 2011; Lavetti 2014 , Bronchetti and McInerney 2012 , 2015 Hansen 2016) , this paper also contributes to the literature on beauty and the labor market (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh 1998; Hamermesh 2012) , the discrimination (Fang and Norman 2006; Anwar and Fang 2006; 2015) and the obesity-wage gap literature in economics (Cawley 2004; Lindeboom et al. 2010; Caliendo and Gehrsitz 2014) . We find that the well documented obesity wage penalty only exists in high risk, physically demanding jobs. Importantly, it does not vary by gender within those jobs. This implies that occupational sorting is likely to be largely responsible for the typically observed pay gap for females found in the literature. For example, DeLeire and Levy (2004) find that variation in occupation-specific fatality risk explains a quarter of gender sorting into occupations. In this sense, our paper bridges the literatures on CWDs, occupational gender sorting, and obesity-related wage differentials. Our findings are consistent with DeLeire (2001), who suggests that discrimination likely plays a minor role in health and gender-specific pay gaps. Instead, our findings support the notion that obese workers may earn lower wages due to their lower (safetyrelated) productivity. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provide an excellent discussion and meta-analysis of empirical CWD studies. Categorizing dozens of US and international labor market studies, they show that estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) vary from basically zero to $20 million. In addition, more than 30 international and US nonfatal risk labor market studies produce estimates of the value of a statistical injury (VSI) that range again from zero to almost $200,000. Several studies do not yield significant VSL or VSI estimates, and there is evidence of publication bias (Leigh 1991; Jennings and Kinderman, 2003; Kniesner et al. 2012; Doucouliagos et al. 2012) . Some reasons provided in the literature for why VSL and VSI estimates differ so widely across studies include the role of unobservables and sorting into occupations (Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990; Shogren and Stamland 2002; Black and Kniesner 2003, Lalive 2003; Leeth and Ruser 2003; Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004; Ashenfelter, 2006; Kniesner et al. 2010; Bommier and Villeneuve, 2010; Kochi and Taylor 2012; DeLeire et al. 2013; Lavetti 2014) . For example, Shogren and Stamland (2002) show that standard VSL estimates are likely to be biased upward if they do not account for worker heterogeneity in both risk preference and skill-the personal ability to reduce risk of death or injury (Ehrlich and Becker 1972) . We confirm the importance of controlling for unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity and changes in individual productivity. Doing so changes the size and significance of our CWD estimates; our preferred specification yields an estimate of $23.5K which is significantly lower than most of the VSI estimates surveyed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) . This paper also adds to that literature theoretically. Only a few previous studies formally model workplace risk as endogenous to workers (Rea 1981; Moore and Viscusi 1990; Krueger 1990; Lanoie 1991; 1994; Ruser and Butler 2010) . Those studies typically model it in the context of Workers' Compensation (WC) benefits, as they are usually concerned with ex ante moral hazard.
They also tend to focus on safety investments through worker demand (Seabury et al. 2005 ). On the one hand, our model is similar to these existing models but it also exhibits some notable differences.
In our model, even a fully insured worker makes safety investments which increase worker productivity, thus firm profits, and also wages. As in previous models, such safety investments increase workers' utility by decreasing the probability of the hazardous state, which entails a personal financial loss. However, our model incorporates a direct incentive for both firms and workers to demand or penalize such human capital (dis)investments given they are valuable to the firm regardless of workers preferences for wages, safety or WC benefits. 6
The next section presents our model of worker investments in safety. The empirical application, research design, data and empirical analysis are presented in Section 3. The results are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
A Model of Worker Productivity Investments in Safety

Worker's Incentives to Invest in Safety
It is known that firms have an incentive to invest in safety because it lowers accident and wage costs, as workers are willing to accept lower wages for a lower risk of accidents. However, workers also have an incentive to invest in safety that is independent of the firm's objectives. Worker safety investments increase utility by decreasing the probability of an accident and the associated loss of wages (Ehrlich and Becker 1972) . These safety investments, however, will only be valuable if there exists a (significant) workplace accident risk. They lose their value in jobs with no risk. Hence, they are investments in what we call "risk-specific" human capital (or safety-related productivity).
To make this point more formally, we begin by considering the worker's incentives drawing on the model by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) . There is a probability p that an accident occurs resulting in the worker's nonfatal injury,
. Workers can make human capital investments in safety, e, which will reduce the probability of an accident. The safety production function is p(S,e,p E ), where S is employer investments in safety and p E is the endowed on-the-job injury risk that is determined by technology. We assume that , 0 ) , , ( 
The worker's problem is to choose investments in safety, e, to maximize expected utility EU as follows:
(1)
The first-order condition is given in equation (A3) (see Appendix B). The marginal benefit of worker safety investments-a reduced accident probability-has to equal its marginal costs, which is its price, q, weighted by the expected marginal utility of income in the accident and non-accident state, respectively. Those investments will be higher, the more productive workers are in producing safety and the lower their price q.
If the quantity of worker investments demanded by the firm exceeds the optimal level of investment that the worker would choose on her own, the employer can induce further investments by compensating workers with higher wages. This wage change is obtained formally by differentiating the expected utility function with respect to wages and worker investments to obtain
Equation (2) shows the magnitude of the return to investments in risk-specific human capital. It is non-negative.
Firm's Incentives to Invest in Safety
Now consider the firm's incentives to invest in safety (S). Building on models by Smith (1974) and Oi (1974) , we assume the employer produces output Q, which is an increasing function of labor
The price of a unit of output is m. An accident can occur with probability p, and the safety production function is the same as above:
Accidents cost the firm A dollars per worker, and include costs of training and replacing injured workers, lost production time of the victim and other workers, lost output and interrupted production. The price of a unit of firm investment in safety is c.
In addition to the firm's incentives to make its own investments as in the standard model, the firm also has an incentive to induce worker safety investments because this would increase profits.
However, competition for workers would bid away these rents and they would have to be returned to the worker. Therefore, the employer would be willing to pay a higher wage for worker investments and would to do so until the wage increase for the last unit of investment equals the decrease in accident costs. 7
To complete the firm's problem, we incorporate the constraint that the value of workers' utility resulting from firm choices is equal to the value of workers' utility that they can achieve on their own (EU * ). The latter is obtained from the solution to the worker problem given by equation (1 . This equation shows wages would rise in response to an increase in worker safety investments, where the magnitude of the wage increase would equal the expected reduction in accident costs. Note that worker investments in safety are no different than any other form of human capital investment. Investment raises worker productivity and is rewarded by higher wages.
captures the idea that workers must be compensated for investing beyond their own optimal investment. The employer's problem is to choose labor (L), investments in safety (S), and worker investments in safety (e) to maximize profits subject to a constraint that workers' utility is equal to EU* (the alternative):
Note that the employer does not incur the worker's cost (qe) of investment but compensates workers with higher wages for undertaking it. The first-order conditions w.r.t. safety investments by firms (S) and workers (e) are given by equations (A7) and (A8) in Appendix B, respectively. The optimal level of those investments in safety requires that their marginal benefits equal the marginal costs.
Differentiating equation (3) with respect to labor (L), and solving for the wage (W) yields a linear association between wages (W), the injury risk (p), and the firm costs of safety investment, (cS):
Equation (4) illustrates that wages depend on the level of firm and worker investments in safety through their effects on risk, p. Our empirical model will be mainly motivated by equations (4) and (2) above.
Although firm-level safety investment and risk measures are not included in our model, we incorporate firm size dummies, a set of 417 occupational dummies at the 3-digit level, 236 industry dummies at the 2-digit level as well as year fixed effects. These variables capture the effects of risk (p) and firm investment costs (cS) in equation (4) above. Note that one could easily reformulate the firm's problem and aggregate it up to the occupational or industry level.
In addition to their own investments, firms can induce safety investments by workers over and above the optimal level they would choose on their own as derived from equation (A3). As mentioned, this may be necessary and efficient since employers (a) cannot make these investments or (b) workers can make them more efficiently, i.e. The wage increase required to keep worker utility constant when the worker invests in safety is given by equation (2). An alternative formulation is derived in Appendix B and given by:
The left-hand-side of equation (5) represents the reduction in accident costs through the increased safety investment, i.e., its marginal benefit. The right-hand-side of equation (5) represents the marginal cost and is the wage increase required to compensate workers for their investment, weighted by their marginal utility of income and the value of changing utility by $1 (χ). 8
Summary of Theory and Predictions to be Tested in the Empirical Analysis
The key insight of our model is that workers can invest in safety and such safety-related human capital investments raise the productivity and value of workers to the firm. Employers induce those investments by paying for them with higher wages. Analogously, firms pay lower wages in the case of (observable) safety disinvestments of their workers. Note that the model does not rely on the absence of a competitive labor market to explain the absence of a wage premium for risk of accidents (Dorman and Hagstrom 1998 ).
An important prediction of the model is that the net effect of accident risk on wages is a priori ambiguous. The standard prediction is that risk and wages are positively associated because firms offer CWDs to attract workers to risky jobs. This is true if risk is exogenously determined, e.g., by technology, and cannot be influenced by workers. However, when workers have the possibility to alter their risk-specific productivity, the association between wages and (worker-produced) risk becomes negative.
The next section estimates the model empirically. To derive testable predictions, we assume that from the perspective of the worker, an occupation's nonfatal injury risk is exogenous. Thus, across occupations, we hypothesize that there is a positive association between occupational risk and wages since firms with higher accident risk have to offer CWDs to attract workers.
However, in line with our model, we also assume that workers can individually modify this exogenously given occupational risk through personal investment in risky-job-specific human capital and thus their productivity. Because it's risk-specific, this safety-related productivity will lose its value in non-risky jobs. Hence, we hypothesize that there is a positive association between measures of worker investments in safety and wages, but only in risky jobs. Since our empirical indicator is weight gain and proxies safety-specific human capital depreciation, we expect a negative association between weight gains and wages, but only in high risk jobs.
Safety-Specific Human Capital, Accident Risk, and CWDs: An Empirical Application
The empirical application exploits weight gains and becoming obese as a proxy for worker productivity losses and depreciation of risk-specific human capital. 9 Because obesity is to a significant degree individually modifiable, preventing it can be thought of as an investment in selfprotection (Kenkel 2000) . Likewise we can think of becoming obese as a disinvestment in human capital and job safety (Bhattacharya and Bundorf 2009) , the result being lower safety-related productivity. We view this set of skills as "risk-specific," akin to firm-specific human capital. It loses its value in jobs that have no risk.
This application is also motivated by the observability of this productivity loss indicator. In addition, there exists evidence that weight gain and obesity increases the risk of accidents and reduces productivity (Stoohs et al. 1994; Froom et al. 1996; Craig et al. 1998; Engkvist et al. 2000; Corbeil et al. 2001; Xiang et al. 2005; Yoshino et al. 2006; Finkelstein et al. 2007; Ostbye 2007; Lakdawalla et al. 2007; Pollack et al. 2007; Cavuoto and Nussbaum 2014) . Using our NLSY dataset to examine the association between becoming obese and the risk of workplace accidents, we find strong supporting evidence of this notion. Regressing an indicator of individual-level workplace accidents on a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics and fixed effects for industries, occupations, years, and individuals, we find that obesity increases the risk of a workplace accident by 21% (results available upon request).
In the empirical analysis, we investigate how this increase in the individual accident risk depresses wages, disentangle this channel from wage differentials that generally compensate for higher occupational accident risks, and study how the two mechanism interact.
Research Design and Methods
The empirical analysis compares obese and non-obese workers' wages in highand low-risk jobs. Specifically, we use the following linear specification, which is motivated by equations (2) and (4) above:
In equation (6), X is a vector of an extensive set of regional, demographic, educational and workplace characteristics (see Appendix A). These characteristics are expected to affect wages and proxy for worker productivity, the price of worker investment in safety, and worker productivity in producing those investments. i  , j  and k  are person, occupation and industry fixed effects, respectively. These are proxies for accident costs and for the productivity and cost of workers' and firms' safety investments (see equation (4)). Those factors are further captured by the firm size dummies included in X.
Importantly, note that including individual fixed effects nets out any unobservable, time-invariant personal factors, such as individual worker productivity and risk preferences.
OB is a measure of obesity (body mass index >30). Note that X additionally includes a continuous measure of BMI. This is to capture non-obesity-related weight effects. 10 RISK is the nonfatal injury rate at the 3-digit occupational level per 100 full-time workers (FTW). 11 It varies across the 417 occupations and over time between 1992 and 2000. OB*RISK is our main variable of interest.
Testing hypotheses. The model predictions and the derived hypotheses that we intend to test empirically are (see Section 2.3):
10 However, the results are robust to excluding the continuous BMI measure. 11 Using fatal risk produces similar results that are, however, estimated with less precision. These are available upon request. We focus on nonfatal risk due to its practical relevance and the higher degree of empirical variation and thus statistical power that can be exploited.
(i) First, across occupations, we expect to find a positive association between occupational accident risk and wages. The first-difference coefficient on RISK yields the CWD for riskier occupations; thus we expect γ to be positive.
(ii) Second, we assume that workers can individually modify the exogenously given occupational injury risk through own human capital investments. We proxy for worker depreciation in risk-specific human capital with OB-becoming obese. Note that there are competing hypotheses here, depending on the reason why obesity would affect wages. If obesity only captures risk-specific human capital, then we expect δ to be small in size and insignificant. Risk-specific human capital is only valuable in risky jobs. Alternatively, a negative coefficient on OB would instead suggest that the wage penalty is due to other factors, such as discrimination, or productivity unrelated to safety.
(iii) Third, this gets us to the core idea of the paper. We hypothesize that worker investments in risk-specific human capital will be valuable only in high-risk occupations. We aim to test whether becoming obese, which represents observable and individually modifiable risk-specific human capital, triggers a wage penalty that varies across the exogenously given occupational job risk.
Because the human capital is risk-specific, it would lose its value in non-risky jobs. A priori, there is no reason to believe that any of the possible alternative explanations under (ii) which would explain a negative relationship between obesity and wages-e.g. discrimination-should differ significantly by the riskiness of the job. Our main coefficient of interest in equation (6) is the interaction term between obesity (OB) and RISK. We expect  to be negative.
Data
Data for the empirical analysis come from three sources. The primary source is the 1979 NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH (NLSY). The NLSY is a sample of 12,686 people aged 14-22 years in 1979. The survey was conducted annually until 1994 and biennially thereafter. All the variables, with the exception of nonfatal injury risk, were obtained from the NLSY. To turn the injury counts into rates, we divide them by annual 3-digit occupation employment counts provided by the March CPS. In what follows, we always report injury rates per 100 full-time workers (FTW). As Appendix A demonstrates, the variation in this crucial variable for our analysis is large; it ranges from 0.006 to 102 nonfatal injuries or accidents per 100 FTW, occupation, and year.
This risk measure is skewed to the right, with an average of 1.9, a median of 1.1, a 90 th quintile of 4.7 and a 99 th quintile of 10.5.
Other Covariates. In our preferred specifications, we control for the following personal characteristics in addition to the individual fixed effects. A first category of controls refers to demographics and includes covariates such as age, gender, race, marital status, and #kids in the household (see Appendix A).
A second category refers to education and includes dummies for high-school degree, some college education, or being a college graduate. We also split the Armed Forces Qualification Test Score (AFQT) into quartiles and include dummy variables for each quartile accordingly.
A third category of controls makes use of workplace characteristics and includes four firm size dummies (<=25, 26-99, 100-499,>500 employees) , an indicator for whether there was a job change, and a dummy indicating whether the person holds a private or public sector job.
Finally, we also include regional controls for economic conditions and characteristics that may affect the value of the worker's marginal product (cf. Bender and Mridha, 2011), i.e., the local unemployment rate (<=6%, 6 to 8.9%, > 9%) as well as the region of residence (northeast, north central, west and south; urban or rural residence).
Note that we always consider the survey year in form of year fixed effects. In more sophisticated models, we additionally incorporate a full set of 3-digit occupation fixed effects (417 dummies) as well as a full set of 2-digit industry fixed effects (236 dummies).
Sample Selection. We focus on six NLSY waves from 1992 to 2000 and restrict the sample to those who worked for pay, worked at least 40 weeks in the year prior to the survey, usually worked at least 24 hours a week, were not self-employed, were not in the armed forces, reported valid 3-digit occupation and 2-digit industry codes, had non-missing data on key variables, and did not have a real hourly wage less than $1 or greater than $100. 14 We drop observations with extreme values of the real hourly wage as they are likely coding errors. After all restrictions, we have a sample of 26,016
person-year observations on 7,006 persons.
Results
Nonparametric Evidence
We begin the empirical analysis by showing mean differences between obese and non-obese workers in Table 1 . This descriptive exercise shows that obese workers earn lower wages on average than their non-obese counterparts ($6.97 vs. $7.74). We can also see from Table 1 that on average, obese people work in slightly riskier occupations. However, considering the huge standard deviation of nonfatal risk of 2.6, the difference in average injury risk per 100 FTW is actually minor (1.9 vs.
2.0).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
An important question is whether our panel data set is well balanced. Perhaps surprisingly, Table 1 shows that the relevant covariates seem to be reasonably well balanced. Column (3) of Table   1 shows that all normalized differences are significantly below 0.25; for most variables, the values are even below 0.1. For example, consider the indicator for whether or not employees changed their job. There is little difference in switching between obese and non-obese workers, and the obese are actually less likely to switch (23.6% vs. 24.6%); the normalized difference is only 1.6%. 15 Figure 1 plots the relationship between the normalized nonfatal occupational accident rate on the x-axis and the hourly wage on the y-axis. One observes a strictly increasing significant association 14 We exclude those in the armed forces as is common in the previous literature. After the aforementioned selection restrictions, the following variables have missing data: wage (N=451), occupation (N=120), industry (N=163), weight or height (bmi) (N=710). 15 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) propose to assess the covariate balance based on scale-free "normalized differences" (see notes to Table 1 for more details). According to their rule of thumb, values below 0.25 suggest a well covariate balance.
between the occupational accident risk and wages. This is the graphical CWD representation and reinforces the according first model prediction of a positive CWD.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Next, Figure 2 shows a nonparametric plot of the relationship between employees' BMI and their individual accident risk. We find an increasing individual accident risk for workers with BMIs between 24 and 34, which reinforces the notion that a body mass above 25 and especially 30 can be interpreted as a form of safety-related productivity losses. On the other hand, keep in mind that Figure   2 is just a nonparametric unconditional correlation that does not exploit the panel structure of the data and may additionally be confounded by selection issues. Figure 3 shows the association between BMIs and wages separately for males (3a) and females (3b). One observes decreasing relationships for both genders. However, for males, the negative association is observed between BMIs of 25 and 40 whereas, for females, we observe it from BMIs of 20 to 35. Again, recall that these pure unconditional associations in levels may mix causal relationships with employee sorting into occupations and other unobservable confounders (DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Shinall, 2015) . Therefore, in Figure 4 we plot changes in the BMI of employees (conditional on being overweight) with changes in hourly wages. We can see that the relationship flattens substantially and it is hard to detect any significant relationship.
The nonparametric visual diagnostics do not control for important factors that may be correlated with job risk, obesity and wages, such as preferences toward risk or other time-invariant unobservables. Thus, we proceed with parametric fixed effects models that net out time-invariant unobservables across industries, occupations, and employees and which additionally adjust the sample with time-variant socio-demographics and firm characteristics. Netting out worker as well as industry, occupation, and firm-specifics seems to be crucial in this setting. Recall that we intend to approximate equations (2) and (4) which include firm-specific safety investment costs as well as marginal worker safety benefits and investment costs. Table 2 additionally controls for a rich array of individual-level controls with respect to demographics, education, and the workplace (see Appendix A). Individual-level factors may likewise confound the relationship between wages, on-the-job risk, and obesity. Note that the (adjusted) R 2 strongly increases from 0.05 in column (1) to 0.39 in columns (2) and (3), illustrating that the most saturated model explains 39% of the variation in wages between employees.
Parametric Evidence
The findings show that (i) the association between occupational injury risk and wages becomes insignificant and very small in size once occupation and industry fixed effects are added to the model. In addition, (ii) the obesity-wage penalty shrinks dramatically in size, from 14% in column
(1) to 4% in column (3) but remains statistically significant. Finally, (iii) the interaction term between firm-specific injury risk and being obese is positive and significant, and thus at odds with our model prediction.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Columns (4) to (6) report results from our preferred specifications. Those specifications similarly include sets of covariates in a stepwise fashion, but most importantly, they additionally include worker fixed effects. This approach is crucial in our context since it nets out all time-invariant unobservable factors at the employee level that may be correlated with both obesity and wages and that may lead to spurious statistical correlations, such as risk preferences or time-invariant unobserved productivity. The effects are now identified by individuals who gain weight and become obese.
Similarly, the CWD effects are identified by variation in job risk at the occupation and industry level.
One finds the following:
First, workers in high risk occupations earn wage premiums. Columns (4) to (6) show that high risk jobs raise wages by 0.5% to 0.6% per additional accident per 100 full time workers. Moving from the median risky job (1.1 accidents) to the 90 th percentile (4.7 accidents) implies a wage premium of about 2%, and moving to the 99 th percentile (10.5 accidents) carries a CWD of about 5%.
This finding is in line with our hypothesis (i) according to which workers in high risk jobs would earn CWDs. Note that this wage premium is identified by workers who either switch occupations or whose occupations become riskier over time and who thus see a change in their occupational risk. Below we show that the effect is not driven by job switchers.
Second, the general statistical association between obesity and wages vanishes. This is consistent with our hypothesis (ii) in Section 3.1. There is no return to risk-specific human capital in non-risky jobs. The absence of a general obesity-wage penalty also rules out alternative explanations for the wage penalty, such as productivity unrelated to safety or general discrimination.
Third, the coefficient of the main variable of interest-the interaction term between obesity and job risk-is negative, highly significant and very robust across all three specifications. We interpret these estimates as the wage differential for risk-specific human capital. Specifically, the estimates indicate that becoming obese reduces wages by about 0.4%-but only in high risk jobs. By excluding job changers we show in a robustness check below that this is not due to an alternative explanation of obese workers switching jobs. The finding that becoming obese leads to a wage penalty only in risky jobs is absolutely in line with our model and hypothesis (iii).
A highly significant wage penalty of 0.4% appears to be small in magnitude; however, it translates into $200 per year for an annual income of $50,000. After a work life of 30 years and assuming a 2% discount rate, this yields a lifetime wage penalty of more than $8,000. Moreover, it is possible that a more direct measure of safety-related human capital would yield estimates of larger magnitude. In addition, our sample consists of relatively young workers. Finally, classical measurement error in the obesity or job risk measures could bias our coefficient of interest toward zero.
The finding also adds generally to the economics literature on the existence of a CWD for nonfatal risk which has not been consistently found. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report (published) estimates for the value of a statistical injury (VSI) that range between zero and $200,000. Applying a $21 hourly wage and a fixed point of 2,000 annual hours as Kniesner et al. (2012) , the nonfatal CWD estimate in column (6) of Table 2 would translate into a VSI of $23.5K. This estimate falls within the range of estimates reported by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) but at the lower end, analogously to the reduced VSL estimate in Kniesner et al. (2012) when considering unobserved worker heterogeneity.
Robustness Checks
We now assess whether there could be alternative explanations for our main findings. First, column (1) of Table 3 excludes workers who changed their jobs. 16 The negative coefficient on our main variable of interest OB*RISK may either stem from workers who become obese or from obese workers who switch jobs and sort into occupations. Table 1 shows that the covariates between obese and non-obese workers are surprisingly well balanced, which supports the view that the negative association is not primarily a result of worker sorting (cf. DeLeire and Levy 2004, Harris 2014 ). Here we bolster that evidence. We find that excluding job switchers yields a surprisingly robust and highly significant negative relationship between becoming obese, job risk, and wages (column (1)).
Becoming obese results in a wage penalty of about 0.5% per additional injury per 100 FTW. We do not find evidence for general obesity wage penalties.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Column (2) of Table 3 re-estimates the model using one year lags for the main covariates of interest. We find that the main coefficient of interest-OB*RISK-shrinks in magnitude but remains statistically significant at conventional levels. 17
Finally, column (3) clusters the standard errors at the occupation instead of the individual level (Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimates are highly robust. In short, by showing that the covariates between obese and non-obese workers are well balanced and by excluding job changers in a robustness check, we provide evidence against the notion that the wage penalty for obese workers in high risk occupations is a result of sorting.
Heterogeneity in Effects
Now we explore whether there is heterogeneity in the main effects of interest. First, we test whether the results differ by gender. We generate and add an additional triple interaction term between female and OB*RISK to the model, in addition to the according two-way interactions. If weight changes reflect changes in human capital-related productivity, then one should not expect to find a wage differential by gender. Column (4) of Table 3 shows no evidence that the main estimate differs by gender. This bolsters the idea that the wage penalty is rather a result of lower risk-specific 17 Note that we lose 2,803 of our total of 7,009 individuals in addition to losing the first observation when individuals are observed more than once. The decrease in observations goes back to the fact that we only include one year lags but there are no observations for the years 1995, 1997, and 1999 which is why we effectively only use data from 1992 to 1994.
productivity. The finding is also in line with DeLeire (2001) who uses US IPP data from the 1980s and 1990s and finds that only 3.7 percentage points of the earnings gap between healthy and unhealthy workers is due to discrimination.
Next, we test whether the results differ by race by including additional triple interaction terms between OB*RISK as well as Black and Hispanic (in addition to two-way interactions between the race indicator and RISK as well as OB). Similar arguments to those made above (with respect to gender) apply here as well. The results (available upon request) show that all workers-in this case across race-ethnicity status-earn lower wages in high risk jobs when they gain weight. We do not find any evidence that the results differ by race.
Column (5) interacts age with OB*RISK and adds this triple interaction along with the twoway interactions to the model. Again there is no evidence that the wage penalty for people who work in high-risk jobs and gain weight differ by age. This, however, could be an artifact of the compressed age variation that we are able to exploit with the NLYS.
The Role of Job Requirements
Thus far we have considered accident risk across occupations and over time. However, certain characteristics of jobs, such as being physically demanding or strenuous, are a plausible channel of transmission underlying the risk-obesity-wage relationship. Strenuousness may lower obese workers' safety-related productivity and thereby increase their risk of workplace accidents.
To investigate this possibility, we generate a variable JobPhysicallyDemanding, which takes on values 0 to 3 and varies across occupations. Higher values represent more strenuous jobs. It indicates whether the job requires (i) climbing, (ii) reaching, or (iii) stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling. 18 We re-estimate our standard models with the addition of this variable in levels along with 18 We assigned these job characteristics to the occupations in the NLSY using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), Revised Fourth Edition, following the work of Lakdawalla and Philipson (2009) (who generously shared their data with us). This consisted of first matching 1990 US Census occupation codes (used in the NLSY) to the occupations a triple interaction term. We hypothesize that the wage penalty for obese workers in high risk occupations is particularly pronounced in jobs with these physical requirements since they would increase the risk of accidents.
The results from this exercise are presented in column (6) of Table 3 . The triple interaction term is significant at conventional levels and of the same size in magnitude as the OB*RISK coefficient in Table 2 , column (6). Note that the OB*RISK coefficient in this model is no longer significant. This illustrates that the obesity-wage-penalty is not only specific to high-risk occupations, but also to high-risk occupations that are physically demanding. This is totally in line with our model and hypothesis: becoming obese indicates a depreciation of risk-specific human capital (safety-related productivity) which translates into a decrease in wages, but only in high risk, physically demanding jobs.
Summary and Conclusions
The standard compensating wage theory assumes that firms and workers face tradeoffs between occupational safety and wages. Firms can pay higher wages to compensate workers for accepting higher risk, or they can invest in safety and sell it to workers in the form of lower wages.
Importantly, the standard model makes the assumption that risk is exogenous to workers, as only firms can reduce risk. We depart from most past research by incorporating worker investments in safety into the standard model. A key prediction of the enhanced model is that accident risk is positively associated with wages only to the extent that it is produced by the firm or determined by technology. However, if risk is "produced" by workers-in other words, when workers invest in safety-related productivity-then lower risk will be associated with higher wages.
in the DOT, and then assigning DOT scores to the US Census occupation codes. Because DOT occupations can be more narrow and specific than the Census occupations-Census occupations can match to multiple DOT occupations-we averaged the DOT scores within each 1990 US Census code to obtain an average score for each Census code. We were unable to assign job characteristics for 147 individuals.
The second part of the paper estimates compensating wage differentials for nonfatal risk using NLSY data, linked with the March CPS and detailed BLS nonfatal risk measures at the annual 3-digit occupation level. In particular, we study the roles of time-invariant unobserved worker characteristics and changes in individual safety-related human capital. Because finding an ideal time-variant measure for safety-related productivity is nearly impossible, we proxy for it using body weight gains of employees. Because obesity is an individually modifiable attribute, weight control can be thought of as an investment in risk-specific human capital (Kenkel 2000) . In addition, changes in body weight are observable to employers and appear to be reasonable indicators of changes in worker productivity in physically demanding high risk jobs. Moreover, there is evidence that obesity increases the risk of accidents and reduces worker productivity (Corbeil et al. 2001; Finkelstein et al. 2007; Pollack et al. 2007 ). Indeed, employing a rich fixed effects model, we find that becoming obese is associated with a higher individual risk of a workplace accident of 1.5 percentage points or 21%.
Our empirical results are in line with our model predictions and empirically disentangle the positive CWD risk-wage association at the occupational level from the negative risk-wage association at the worker level. Employing our uniquely compiled dataset, we obtain a precisely estimated positive relationship between nonfatal occupational risk and individual wages. This is the standard CWD finding. We show that netting out unobserved time-invariant worker characteristics (e.g. risk preferences) is crucial in this setting. Standard cross-sectional OLS estimates are either not statistically significant or even carry the "wrong" sign. Using a mean wage of $21, our estimate implies a value for a statistical injury (VSI) of about $23.5K which is lower than many previous estimates. This resembles the main finding of Kniesner et al. (2012) who find that VSL estimates decrease by a factor of three to four when considering time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition to the standard CWD estimate, we find a highly significant negative relationship between weight gains, occupational job risk, and wages. When workers become obese, they face a wage penalty of about 1.5% in high risk as compared to median risk jobs (90 th vs. 50 th risk percentile).
For every additional injury per 100 FTW and year, the wage penalty for obese workers increases by about 0.5%. Put differently, risk-specific human capital depreciation is associated with wage losses, but only in risky jobs, where that human capital matters.
Although our empirical model includes hundreds of occupational and industry fixed effects along with individual fixed effects and is identified by workers who become obese and do not change jobs, we do not interpret our empirical findings as strictly causal. However, they are in line with our model predictions and the idea of worker investments in risk-specific human capital. NLYS and SOII 1992-2000; years 1995 , 1997 , 1999 are gap years. The leftmost column indicates the variable and the following column defines it. Columns 1-5 display the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum variable values, and the number of observations, respectively.
Appendix B: A Model of Worker Investment in Safety
The Maximization Problem of the Worker
In our model of workers' investments in safety (Section 3), worker expected utility is given by
The basic worker problem is to choose investments in safety, e , to maximize expected utility EU (A2) ) ( ) , , ( If the quantity of worker investments demanded by the firm exceeds the optimal level of investment that the worker would choose, the employer can induce further investments by compensating workers with higher wages. For example, a fully insured worker would not invest, but the employer may find additional investment profitable. Thus, the question becomes what wage increase is necessary to induce the worker to invest beyond the quantities implied by equation ( If the worker was fully insured, U1 = U0, he would have no personal incentive to invest: the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (A4) would be zero and the wage increase "charged" by the worker to invest would be given by dW/de=q. This shows that for fully insured workers, the wage increase required to invest in safety would equal the cost of investment q. This captures the idea that workers must be compensated for investing beyond their own optimal investment.
The Maximization Problem of the Firm
The employer's problem is to choose labor (L), investments in safety (S), and worker investments in safety (e) to maximize profits subject to a constraint that workers' utility is equal to EU* (the alternative): The first-order conditions to this problem are given by:  Equation (A7) yields the optimal level of employer investments in safety (S). The left-handside of the equation is the marginal benefit of investment, which is the sum of the reduction in accident 40 costs and the increase in worker utility resulting from the risk reduction weighted by the value of changing utility by $1 ) ( . The increase in utility resulting from the investment is a benefit to the employer because workers accept lower wages in return.
Equation (A8) yields the optimal level of worker investments in safety, e. The left-hand-side is the marginal benefit of such investment, which consists of the decrease in accident costs plus the increase in weighted utility stemming from the reduced injury risk. The right-hand-side is the investment's marginal cost, which is the worker's cost of investment (q) weighted by his marginal utility of income.
Equation (A6) states that the value of the marginal product of labor must equal its marginal cost, which is the sum of the wage, expected accident cost and cost of firm investment in safety.
Solving for the wage (W) yields:
, Equation 9 shows that wages depend on the level of employer and employee investments in safety through their effects on risk, p. Such investments in turn depend on a variety of factors. Equation (A7) shows that optimal employer investments in safety will differ depending on their price (c), 
